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INTRODUCTION

Is it possible, after all, that we may be fooling ourselves in thinking that history teaches us something? The volume of histories written
may be only a retelling of the mistakes that the future is destined to make
on a greater scale. Although much of this history is at times wearying,
there is always the unusual, the dramatic, and the singular event that
claims our various interests. The Nonpartisan League of North Dakota
was one such event for the writer of this paper.
Our knowledge of any past event is ·always incomplete, inaccurate
to some degree, confused by opposing viewpoints of historians, obscured
by partisan sources, and perhaps distorted by our own bias.

The highly

controversial nature of the Nonpartisan League and the emotional nature
of the disloyalty charges that raged around it make this topic doubly
ambivalent.

It is the purpose of this paper to try to determine the

validity, or lack of it, and the purposes served by the accusations of
disloyalty used by the League opposition i.n efforts to bring discredit to
this virulent political movement.
The writer approached the study of this topic by a survey of books,
articlesl newspapers, Nonpartisan League manuscripts and publications,
and personal papers of selected leaders of the League.
1

The holdings and

2
materials made available through the History Department and Library staff
at the University of North Dakota were extensive.

The author wishes to

compliment these people and profess his gratitude for their excellent,
congenial assistance, without which very little of this writing could have
been achieved.
Gaps in source materials and difficulties in finding information arise
primarily from the absence of records, which was the result of a noticeable
tendency of League leadership to conduct affairs without writing things
down and a pronounced failure to maintain records.

The failure may have

been calculated to some degree .
The topics that the writer wishes to examine within the paper are:
The Progressive and reform movements in relation to the unique
forces of population that contributed to them in North Dakota at the turn
)

of the century which aided development of the Nonpartisan League.
The roles of two leading figures of the Nonpartisan League, Arthur
C. Townley and William Lemke, and their anti-war positions as dis-

)

played by their speeches and correspondence, as well as how historians
and biographers have interpreted these men's ideas.
1

The Nonpartisan League s principles and programs toward profiteer)

ing and huge business combines, and the control these forces held over
government.
Support by the Nonpartisan League and North Dakotans for the
"boys at the front" and the country's war effort.

3

The origin of charges of disloyalty which led to criminal prosecution of League leaders, and the use made of these charges by League
opponents.
The validity connected with the proposition that, without changes
resulting from World War I, the loyalty attacks by opponents of the
League would not have seriously discomfited the League.
The League as a matter of principle had always opposed excessive
profits reaped by monopolization and trust building, business control of
political processes through control of party politics, a biased and
irresponsible press serving the interests of privilege and politicians,
unequal distribution of wealth and unequal taxation, and political and
economic domination of land and production by absentee wealth or power.
The League believed remedying these evils. by state ownership and
regulation of mills, banks, insurance companies, transportation lines,
newspapers, and wholesale suppliers of equipment necessary for production. They supported the concepts of progressive taxation on profits,
self-determinism of all populations, and initiative public state, national,
and international negotiations and policymaking.
While the League had successfully demonstrated the validity of its
)

economic goals, it allowed itself to be entangled in the philosophical
issues of patriotism by its opponents who found issues with emotional
l

charge more important and appealing than dry economics. We seek an
answer to the question:

"Was the League unpatriotic, or did the war

simply provide a new rationale for opposition by its traditional enemies?"

CHAPTER I
J,

PROGRESSIVISM, TWENTIETH-CENTURY, AND NORTH DAKOTA

Most historians of twentieth-century America would agree that the
effective beginnings of contemporary reform ideals can be traced to the
Progressive Era.

David W. Noble, in an article published in the American

Quarterly, stated that:
Progress, for the average American of the nineteenthcentury, was a law whose validity y.ra s beyond doubt.
During the first decade and a half of the next--our
present--century, this deep-rooted affirmation reached a
high point of intensity, calling forth an emotional and
intellectual enthusiasm that has indelibly labeled these
years as the Progressive Era. 1
The influence of immigration, growth of urbanization, and intellectual
1

associations of Charles Darwin s thoughts on evolution with a definition
of progress all combined to bolster these demands for reform.
In the capitalist economy that had developed during the nineteenthcentury, the stress on freedom for personal choice to be good or evil had
been interpreted by the. defenders of the system in a way that justified
concentration of wealth as natural and inevitable. American capitalists
maintained that inequalities were not only natural and inborn, but also
tended

t6 expand with the growth of civilization. Competition was the

J

4

5

life of growth, and business was the essence of competition.

Hereditary

inequalities bred social and artificial inequalities within which the
strong gained control over technological innovations and became
stronger; the weak became relatively weaker.

The acceptance of this

rationalization carried with it the conclusion that the concentration of
wealth would be periodically alleviated by violent or peaceable partial
redistribution. 2
Progressives countered by saying that the weak are devoured in
nature by the strong.
by due process of law.

Man in civili-zation attempts to consume other men
Unless the masses are protected by the power of

rules or collective action, abuse is inevit.able. The Progressives
believed also that cooperation was a reality increased by social development and became a form of competition.

Men cooperated in the group,

community, club, party, and nation in order to strengthen their competitive position with others.

These competitive groups took on the qualities

of competing individuals: acquisitiveness, pugnacity, partisanship,
pride, fear, and hate.

Political, and non-political, parties were the

state's fulfillment of this natural competition.
In the Social Darwinist's interpretation of capitalism, each stage
of man's development was seen as being in competition with the next.
It was once said that "civilization is a parasite on the man with the
hoe.

11

But the man with the hoe no longer existed in the most advanced

areas of the country in 1·900. The man with the hoe was becoming the

6

hand at the wheel of a tractor or combine. Agriculture was becoming an
industry, and the farmer would have to make his choice between being
the employee of a capitalist or the employee of a state.
The struggle between socialism and capitalism was, and is,
according to the defenders of the latter, part of the historic rhythm in
the concentration and dispersion of wealth.

In the industrial stage of

man's existence, "the men who can manage men manage the men who
can manage only things, and the men who can manage money manage
all.

113

This was the rationale of entrepeneurial capitalism in the last

half of the nineteenth-century. The bankers watched the trends in
agriculture, industry, and trade; and they invited and directed the flow
of capital by controlling loans and interest and enterprise.

They ran

great risks to make great gains, and they rose to the top of the heap if
they were the "fittest to survive.

11

According to this theory every economic system beyond the agricultural stage had to depend upon sorrie form of profit motive to convince
individuals to continue productivity beyond their own needs. 4 The
capitalist was only fulfilling a creative function in history.

He had

gathered the savings of people into productive capital by assuring his
suppliers of interest and dividends.

He was thus able to finance the

mechanization of industry and agriculture, which had created such a
flow of goods from producer to consumer as history had never seen
before.

The businessman, left relatively free from any unnatural control

7
)

.

over the laws of supply and demand, as well as the regulation of legislatures, could give the public a greater abundance of food, homes, comfort,
and leisure than had ever come from politically managed economies.

The

"Great American Way" preached that in free enterprise, competition and a
healthy zeal for ownership encouraged productiveness and inventiveness,
which in turn allowed every person with ability to find a place for his
talents, and the natural selection of skills would return just ·rewards.
Basic democracy ruled the process when most articles to be produced,
and the services to be rendered, were determined by ·consumer demand
rather than by government decree. The nature of competitiveness did
compel the capitalist to exhaustive labor, and his products were constantly improved in excellence. There was a little truth to such claims
in the last half of the nineteenth-century.
These claims of capitalism, however, did not satisfy the need for
an explanation about why history was full of protests and revolts against _
abuses by industrial masters, price manipulation, business chicanery,
and irresponsible use of wealth-giving resources.

Crusted with age,

these abuses have called forth socialist experiments in many places and
times in history.
The Progressive Era was one during which the concentration of
wealth reached such a point that the strength of numbers among the many
poor .was hardly able to rival the power of the few rich.

This unstable

equilibrium generated a critical situation which the reformers hoped to

)

8

remedy by legislative redistribution, because revolutionary means of
adjusting inequalities were odious to them.

Imbued with a mixture of

selfish and altruistic motives, reinforced by decreasing real income as a
result of the price inflation that came about in 1897, middle-class

r~formers set out to right the errors of their society. 5 They wished to
secure legislation providing for more democratic methods within the
political machinery, which would break the power of corrupt bosses who
manipulated unfortunate an_d unknowing immigrant voters.

They hoped to

expose and curtail the practices of -unscrupulous businessmen whose
maneuvers were subverting good government.
Between 1900 and 1920, American statute books became studded
with the results of people-oriented reform drives.

The direct primary,

the initiative, the Clayton Act, the Seventeenth Amendment, a revived
Interstate Commerce Commission, workmen's compensation, child labor
laws, and Prohibition--these and many other achievements testified to
the intensity of Progressivism.
)

The multitude of reform groups during the period had augmented the
government's role as the watchdog over the economy--a role not yet
fully accepted in the United States. Their purpose was either to maintain the traditional

11

small business" regime of competitive free enter-

prise they believed existed, or at least to make sure that oligopolists
really made consumer benefits available from their large scale operations.

6

It is admitted that all that was done in the name of reform might

9

not have been an improvement.
Age of Reform,

11

In his article, "Urban Liberalism and the

J. Joseph Huthmacher stated:

Some measures, notably Prohibition, are counted today as
being wrong-headed, while some political panaceas like the
direct primary elicited an undue degree of optimism on the
part of their exponents. 7
It was, however, through the effective use of the primary that the Non-

partisan League of North Dakota gained its first political power and
recognition.
The impact of westward expansion, industrial growth, and the concentration of wealth and political power, of concern throughout the
country, seemed to have especial relevance for North Dakotans at the
turn of the century.

Elwyn B. Robinson has described the situation at

that time as one in which the state was virtually an exploited colony of
eastern business interests. 8 In Robert L. Morlan' s Political Prairie Fire,
we find the opinion that the state was controlled by an oligarchy of grain
and railroad interests not located in North Dakota, but directed from
Minneapolis and St. Paul--the banking, milling, and railroad head)

quarters of the reg ion. 9
The first great attraction which drew· the permanent settler to the
region was the agricultural wealth promised by the Red River Valley.
Coming at the heighth of optimism and expectations of Progressivism,
the homeisteaders felt that everything could be made continuously better.
Many brought with them Progressive or Populist ideals from the East or

10

Europe. They could see that North Dakota was the perfect place to
institute the ideas of Progressivism before the abuses and corruptions of
industrialization had complicated their agrarian way of life.

The Non-

partisan League of North Dakota embodied all of the influences that
spread throughout the United States with the Progressive Era and its
ideals of reform can easily be found in this exceptional movement.

The

formulation of Nonpartisan League policies embodied elements of
populism, anti-monopolism, agrarianism, and Socialism.
Considered as a mass movement, Progressfvism was a response of
the average man to the challenges to his accustomed or hoped-for status;
much of Progressive sentiment was clearly directed toward regaining the
"good old days.

11

Nevertheless, the predominant social thinkers of this

movement, while illuminating attendant abuses, accepted the fact of the
new industrial forces; indeed, they more than accepted; they waxed
eloquent about the promise of the future.
Then, suddenly and without warning, the tragedy of World War I
burst upon this generation and, amidst the smoke of battle, the Progressive Era vanished.

Seldom

I

if ever

I

has there been such a sharp and

clear division of periods in American history as there was between that
of the Progressive Era and that which succeeded it. Americans have continued to believe in progress; but the assurance, the certainty, and the
clos~

identification of this idea with a total moral reawakening have

gradually receded.

11

David W. Noble, in "The Paradox of Progressive Thought" tells us:
The simplicity of conditions that had fostered faith in progre.ss
had disappeared and with their disappearance went the naive
belief in the inevit~bility of progress. When thinking of this
process by which Americans were divested of their innocence
and faith, it is convenient to take World War I as the symbolic
opening moment, a sharp. and harsh beginning but only the
beginning, for major ideas are not obliterated by a single
historical event. 10
The past history of America contains no more unusual set of circumstances than that through which many of the leading thinkers of the
Progressive movement were destroyed in effectiveness.

In the short

period of six years, from 1914 to 1920, men who had held the public
spellbound with their words at the beginning of the War were, after the
War was ended, unable to reach the public ear and joined the legions of
disillusioned.

The leaders of the Nonpartisan League must be counted

among those who lost their place at the top.
In North Dakota, often furiously cold in winter, two very warm
pioneer populations from widely varied origins, but similar in hardiness
and demand for freedom, proved the courage of immigrants and banded
1

together to constitute a farmers reform revolt unique, however brief,
in American history.

CHAPTER II

THE ANTI-WAR POSITION OF THE NONPARTISAN LEAGUE
LEADERSHIP A. C. TOWNLEY AND WILLIAM LEMKE

In the second decade of the twentieth-century, North Dakota
became the focal point of one of the most vigorous movements for reform
occurring in American history. The Nonpartisan League of North Dakota
was conceived and founded by Arthur C. Townley.

It was his genius

that provided the adaptation of parts of the many reform movements and
made them seem remarkably well fitted to both the time and place.
Throughout most of its active history the League was dominated by
the personality and organizing ability of A. C. Townley, one of the great
natural leaders of protest movements which this country has produced. 11
Although Townley was never elected to an office, he commanded the
respect of friend and foe as a political organizer. His ability as an orator
was one of Townley's widely recognized and respected assets. Campaigning throughout both Minnesota and North Dakota, Townley delivered
fiery, controversial speeches to huge audiences wherever he went. 12
The controversial nature of Townley's speeches and the emotional,
attacking style were to create the atmosphere out of which violent

12

13
anti~League

tactics grew. As a speaker with a great deal of natural

tale ht, Townley had acquired some education and training which, combined with growing experience and strong emotional involvement in his
work, gave him a unique command over his listeners.

He quickly

gained a reputation for his caustic attacks upon business interests, and
huge ,crowds appeared to be entertained as well as informed.1 3 According to Alice C. Poehls, his greatest inventive asset was the emotional
proof apparent in the arrangement, audience adaptation, language, and
use of humor • 14 Because he spoke primarily to sympathetic farmers
groups, Townley became more convincing as a result of demonstrating
his understanding of their problems, his display of high moral character,
and his real interest in those to whom he was speaking.
As President of the Nonpartisan League, Townley was most often
referred to by his detractors as "czar,

11

"dictator," and

11

autocrat.

11

Though Townley shared the leadership of the League, and therefore its
decision making, he did retain the predominant power in his own hands.
Accordingly, questions about the organization's pos-ition on issues were
ultimately considered to be his views.
A. C. Townley as well as other leading figures within the League
were and would remain opposed to war as a matter of principle even after
the European
conflict was over •. In a pamphlet entitled "How To Finance
'?:
The Great War,

11

published by the National Nonpartisan League in St.

Paul, the position was stated as follows:

)

14
War is ever the great calamity. The most righteous war is no
exception. It is still a calamity that nations should have to
suffer to get the rights that should flow freely to them merely
because they are rights. 15
This did not mean that the League was unwilling to support the country or
the President.

It fully agreed with the position that oppressive regimes

might have to. be overturned.

In the

11

Resolutions Adopted by the Non-

partisan League Conference, 11 a statement of the proceedings of the
September 1917 conference, the resolutions stated:

"We are involved in

the most gigantic war of all history--a war for Democracy and Liberty
against Autocracy and Slavery. 1116 For the Nonpartisan League, right
had to demand that "the only justification for war is to establish and
maintain human rights and interests the world over.

For this reason we

are opposed to waging war for annexation, either on our part or that of
our allies. 1117 Being opposed to waging war for annexation on the part
of other nations was considered to be proper in the nationalist thinking.
Of course, when annexation was accomplished by the United States, or
her allies, it was to establish and maintain human rights.

Pecuniary

interests were not a part of American involvement; to hint that they might
be was un-American.
Deeply rooted in an almost purely agricultural way of life, North
Dakota was a land of immigrants.

The two major groups, the Norwegians

and the German-Russians, came in response to land-sale advertisement
sponsored by railroads and grain-trade businesses.

18

Recognizing that

15
)

.

the maintenance of a steady flow of population into North Dakota country
required the encouragement of immigration, the railroads created "Chambers of Commerce

11

to advertise and sell land.

The Norwegians came first and settled in the more fertile and rain
abundant Red River Valley region located on the eastern edge of the state.
The German-Russians came later and settled in the poorer lands to the
west and frequently found that the advertisements had painted a more
glowing picture than reality justified. 19 Both of these groups were, and
have remained, fairly close-knit economic and social elements. This
ethnicity provided an easy means of political appeal for the Nonpartisan
League, a situation it quickly and efficiently capitalized into votes.

Not

only was the League platform designed to appeal to their group sentiment,
but the use of Norwegian and German publications and the courting of
local churches and priests added much to League success. 20 The
appointment of William Lemke as second in command within the League
provided a spokesman in the German language as well as a capable
contact widely known and liked among the German-Russian population. 21
Unlike most agrarian movements, the Nonpartisan League was not
born during an era of great poverty and crises. The movement germinated
from the idea that the corporate forces dominating the marketplace should
and could be made to be responsive to the individual producers. The
policies of the League were predicated on a belief that power should not
only rest with the people _but that through the democratic process it

16

could be actively and directly wielded by these people to serve their own
best interests.

Robert L. Morlan, in his book Political Prairie Fire: The

Nonpartisan League, 1915-1922, informs the reader that the League was
" .. . . an organization proclaiming public ownership and control as a
solution for economic ills, which was in time actually able to put its
principles into practice on a statewide scale. 1122 The appeal to the
farmer and to state pride was based on the principle that sources far
removed from the actual labor of production should not reap great surplus
profits through manipulation of economic and political processes, while
those laboring to produce were left with meager return from their work
and investment.
The Nonpartisan League worked hard to gain control of North Dakota.
Its organizers were trained by Townley to make full use of personal
contact, and the buttonhole tactics were rewarded by spectacular
success. 2 3 Not only was the League to control for some years the
government of North Dakota, elect state officials and legislators in a
number of midwestern and western states, and send several representatives of the League to the United States Congress, but also it was to
have lasting influence upon the destinies of many of the nation's voters
and policies. 24
The"" Nonpartisan League was one of the rarest of examples in
American history of an attempt by agricultural sectors to correct the dislocation produced by the .growth of political and economic dualism

17

brought forth by industrialization. The League was one of the most
sweeping and least violent programs ever tried as a solution to the world
of "haves and have nots.

11

The lack of violent tactics employed by the

League was remarkable in light of the amount of violence and abuse
eventually mustered against its members.
Morlan states that it was owing to its proposals and the methods
by which it operated, and the period in which it developed, that the
League era was one of almost " . . . . unparalleled ill-feeling in those
states in which it was a significant political force.

1125

The degree of

emotion directed aga-inst the League may in part be traced to the nonpartisan nature of the organization. Townley's insight perceived that
the control of party machinery was the result of the ability of individuals
to control the legal structure dictating nominations and elections.
Townley was able to grasp the full meaning of the party primary and the
use to which it could be put to work against the parties.

Townley

explained the idea as follows:
Inasmuch as the lack of respect for farmer rights could be
laid to neither the Republican party nor the Democractic party
exclusively, we hit upon the idea of us~ng a no-party or nonpartisan organization. 2 6
This would allow both Democrats and Republicans who wanted to vote for
certain principles of the League to become members without leavingI their
traditional parties. The same reasoning was the foundation of the

18

decision to nominate candidates in the Republican primaries.

Townley

stated:
~ . . the Republican farmers would have no feeling of leaving
their own party whatever and Democratic farmers would not feel
that they had deserted their party because they were trying to
force their own men over in the Republican primary. 2 7

On some occasions the League went beyond the primaries by throwing its
support to Democratic or Socialist candidates.
Despite gaining control of the Republican state chairmanship in
1916, the League officials were emphatic in denying their affiliation
with the Republican party.. In the Nonpartisan Leader, the official League
publication, the following statement appeared:

" • . . the League is NOT

the Republican party. The League is not a movement WITHIN ANY PARTY.
The League has nothing to do with old parties. 112 8 Of course, this risked
alienation of some staunch Republican party members.
The non-party position, the non-capitalist nature of the League programs, the high percentage of recent immigrants, and the previous thirdparty affiliation of hired League personnel were certain to draw comments
about the un-American character of the Nonpartisan League.

One of the

earliest aspersions labeled both the programs and the members of the
League as Socialist. Socialism as a term in American history has been
used so imprecisely that it can mean almost anything the listener wants
to hear.

ft was a fact that many of the personnel within the League had

wo.rked for and held membership in Populist or Socialist organizations

19
J.

and these organizations in capitalist United States were un-American.
This tendency to use the term Socialist loosely makes it difficult to
deal with these accusations even now.

Robinson, in History of North

Dakota, entitled the chapter on the Nonpartisan League as "The Great
Socialist Experiment.

11

Then without attempting to explain his assess-

ment, Robinson labeled the party, its programs, its membership and
the leaders as Socialist. 29 It is not surprising, therefore, that less
professional writers would have used the same loose interpretation.
Labor-management conflicts had long since made Socialist thinking the
opposite of good American ideas.
Many--including Robinson--were sincere in their feelings that
much about the League was anti-American.

It is equally evident that all

manner of strategy was created to be used to discredit the League.

One

such circumstance was the State Library scandal. Larry Remele, in an
article published in North Dakota History, has thoroughly examined the
Library scandal issue and concluded that the incident grew out of purely
*political machinations.
The Independent Voters Association, .an association that was
created to oppose the Nonpartisan League, had mounted a number of
smear campaigns against the League on the basis of the League's being
dominate4 by "bolshevistic" interests. 30 This particular move was in
resp·onse to the creation of a Board of Administration as part of the 1919
state government reorganization program.

The viciousness of the

20

allegations was the result of the implications that the Nonpartisan
League was trying to subvert American society by procuring indecent and
un-American books for the public schools.

Representative Olger B.

Burtness, a foe of the Nonpartisan League, made the charges in the 1919
session of the Legislature. The description given by Burtness to the
legislative body characterized a book written by Ellen Key, Love and
Ethics, as one that
.... teaches your boy and your girl there is no holiness in
marriage; that love and childgetting out of marriage are a
glorious thing; that there is no such things as the sanctity
of the home and of motherhood and fatherhood. 31
Remele's article showed that the League was exonerated by an
investigating committee and by Burtness' s own admission that he had not
examined the books properly and that he had been guilty of poor select ion
of words.

This ended the public and legislative activities concerning the

matter, but the damage that had touched the members of the League and
the organization's reputation was not completely undone.
Voters Association never ceased using the phrases

11

The Independent

free love

11

and

"bolshevik 11 to refer to members of the League, and the tendency spread
to the news media.
The clannish nature of the Norwegian and German-Russian population that made up most of the League gave it the image of a group of
"foreigners" to some others in the state. The impending war increased the

21
suspicion concerning their real beliefs.
Dakota and the European War,

11

Robert P. Wilkins in

11

North

stated:

Deeply rooted ideological distrust of the financial and industrial
capitalist classes by the German and Norwegian elements of the
population which was greatly intensified by the exploitation of
North Dakota producers, may be chiefly to account for the
persistent opposition to policies that appeared to lead to war. 3Z
This distrust on both sides of the question by the League members and
non-League population was to remain a problem throughout the war.
The growing possibility of the United States' becoming involved in
the World War intensified the conflict between political factions either
supporting neutrality or those who pushed for taking an active part in the
battle. North Dakota was decidedly pacifistic in the early stages of the
developing conflict in Europe, as were most other western states. There
was, for a considerable period of time, as much sentiment for Germany
as there was support for Britain. Whether or not the Nonpartisan League
took its cue from national politics in the 1915-1916 campaign year, the
League's position on the war issue was almost identical to that of
Woodrow Wilson. There can be little doubt that Townley, other League
leaders, and many of the rank and file were strongly against the United
States' becoming involved in the war in any way.

It was impossible for

North Dakota farmers to connect the European affair to their needs or
interests ..

i"._.

Prior to President Wilson's mes sage, delivered on the evening of
April 2, 1917, in which he asked the Congress of the United States for a

22
declaration of war, it is

dif~icult

to find any evidence of an official war

policy for the League. There is a paucity of pronouncement concerning
the international situation in official League publications or speeches.
Those statements that were made were discussions in a philosophic
manner of the evils of war and plaudits for President Wilson's determination to stay neutral.

This position was consistent with the League

strategy. Any quest ion not directly related to the farmers' needs in
North Dakota was viewed as irrelevant.

Issues that were likely to

introduce heated differences of opinion within the agricultural community
were avoided, if at all possible.

Herbert E. Gaston stated:

The fact is that the League, up until the declaration of war
by our government, had studiously and carefully refrained
from any expression of opinion or policy on war and peace
questions, the Allies or Germany. 33
As long as it could, the League remained evasive on the war issue.
The leaders of the Nonpartisan League sought to pursue with
unusual dedication their own political program without allowing controversial or devisive issues to claim their attention. Achieving reorganization of state government, freei!lg the farmer from control of monopolistic
"Big Biz," and gaining financial aid and insurance programs were far more
important in the League's infant stages.

The problem. of European conflict

was far away and none of the League member's concern. League leaders
viewed as \heir primary purpose serving the interests of the members,
who spent their energies upon the land in long hours of labor which left

. 23

scarce time for concern about world problems.

Gaining programs upon

which they had campaigned was not only a commitment but also a means
of building up their own following.
As the League success began to consolidate North Dakota membership and the League-controlled legislature began enacting reform programs, the leadership of the organization began to become known.
William Lemke was the most likely successor to Townley within
the League administration. 34 On several occasions Townley was flattering in his praise of Lemke as the man upon whom he most depended
within the League. At the first annual meeting of State Committeemen
of the National Nonpartisan League in 1919, Townley introduced Lemke,
who was one of the speakers.

Townley stated:

• ~ . Mr. Lemke has above all the men in this organization,
served it MOST whole-heartedly, and efficiently. . . • I have
in him absolute and complete confidence. And I hope that if
anything should happen to me, that you first of all, for someone
to lead this organization, will not neglect the counsel of this
one man of the Northwest, that in his sacrifices to advance thiscause, has proved in the last two years that he would DIE for it! 3 5
As chairman of the Republican party, the League's attorney, and frequent
trouble-shooter for Townley, Lemke was able to stay well informed about
the overall activities of the League.

Often, Lemke accepted the addi-

tional burden of assisting farmers who sought help for their legal
problems.

In his biography, Edward C. Blackorby points out that this

was the basis for Lemke's devotion to the League.
11
•

•

•

Blackorby states:

more than anything else, Lemke needed to feel that he was
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influential. 1136 Lemke gave so much time to the work of the Nonpartisan
League that his income from legal practice was meager.

His salary as

an employee of the League was modest, and he appears to have been
an easy mark for anyone who was "down on his luck. 11 This seems to be
the way Lemke wanted to have things remain.

Blackorby assures the

reader that:
Being at the center of power and influence and feeling that he
was making progress toward the removal of society's ills were
more satisfying rewards to Lemke than the larger fees he might
have collected. Townley and the Nonpartisan League had
made him a political factor in the state; a goal that had been
Lemke's for a long time. 3 7
William Lemke, unlike Townley, was unusually direct and succinct
in his statements about his views. The prolific correspondence and later
speeches indicated a bent for logical arrangement of his thoughts.

He

also seems to have been prone to be blunt and argumentative in asserting
his opinions. This was a characteristic that also tended to create
enemies among the opposition.
That the position of the League on most matters was one with
which he was in tacit agreement appears reasonable.

Lemke's strategic

position with the League indicates that the League placed great value on
Lemke's abilities.

His biographer stated:

Lemke's secret for success lay largely in a tireless capacity
for work and a drive that sustained him through eighteen-hour
. days ;nbroken by the conviviality in which so many public
figures find relaxation. 38
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Among those who were familiar with the League and those who
voted, certainly within North Dakota, Lemke was understood to be a
power capable of moving the other leaders of the League.

His vision and

imagination, his capacity to dream great dreams, made Lemke the source
of ideas for the League. 39 Carl Nelson, editor of The Cando Record and
friend of Lemke, sent him a note in which he commented upon an item
found in another newspaper.

Nelson wrote:

11

To be called 'the brains of

the Nonpartisan League' is not such an awful slam it seems to me. 1140
Lemke seems to have been particularly popular with members of
~

the farmer's movement, particularly the German population. A tremen:....
dous volume of letters to Lemke shows that people were convinced that
he would help them if they asked.
That Lemke carved out a seat of power within the League organization is demonstrated by the fact that he decided to stay with the
League rather than make a bid for Congress upon the death of Henry T.
Helgesen.

Many letters of sympathy, several irate at the League, were

written to Lemke when it became known that John M. Baer, the Nonpartisan Leader cartoonist, had been

chos~n

to receive League support

in the race to fill the vacancy left by Helgesen.

41

William Lemke was to become subject to the same general accusations from the Nonpartisan's opposition as were directed at other leaders.
His German background made it almost inevitable that he would have
been singled out as pro-German.

His avowed position against England
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added much fuel to the charges.

Concerning his dedication to the pro-

gram of the League, there was no doubt.

His loyalty sometimes became

over-zealousness toward those people and causes he chose to back.
When others were vacillating over the La Follette incident, Lemke never
wavered in his staunch support of the Senator. 42 The La Follette incident is explained in Chapter V.

It became the national press basis

for branding the League pro-German and un-American.

Such incidents

made him an admirable friend but tended to provide propaganda for the
opposition later in his career .. It was difficult at times to determine
just when Lemke was being loyal and when he was acting out of
stubbornness.
Lemke campaigned tirelessly for Charles Evans Hughes in 1916,
and could never quite accept Woodrow Wilson's election.

He expressed

the opinion after the election that he was sorry to know that the people
of North Dakota did not know who that man Wilson was.

In an answer

to a letter he had received, he stated:
. • . There are a whole lot worse things about Mr. Wilson
than his Mexican policy. If t?e American people only knew
the truth, he would never have gone to first base; but big
business can even fool some of the farmers. 43
In his mind Lemke never believed that Wilson had won the election in
North Dakota.

In a number of. letters and notes to friends he expressed

the beliet that a recount would show the state for Hughes .. As chairman
of the Republican party for the state he did not call for a recount, since
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he knew it would not have changed the final outcome.

However, Lemke

waited for the election returns from California before conceding the race
in the state. 44
1

Although Lemke s oppostion does not seem to have brought any
1

severe reaction from President Wilson, there was some damage to Lemke s
future effectiveness in working with the administration.
1

described Lemke s approach as "combative extremism

11

Blackorby
and felt that the

natural alliance between the programs of the Nonpartisan League and the
Democratic party after World War I was prevented by Lemke's persistent
anti-British and anti-war attitude.

This abrasiveness was to work

against the best interests of both the League and Lemke on some very
vital occasions.
Although his correspondence indicates that Lemke urged others to
be cautious with their statements if they appeared too harsh for the
welfare of the League, he was subject to extremes that denied him the
moderation that might have saved the Nonpartisan League many of its
most discrediting indictments. 45
William Lemke was characterized as a very capable campaigner
and highly motivated speaker.

That his speeches did not bring the

troubles to him that befell others can be attributed to the amount of time
he spent in behind-the-scene work, to his traveling primarily within
North Dakota, and to the fact that he was recognized throughout the
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area as a very capable defense attorney.

Nevertheless, there were times

when he endured much abuse.
The fact that he was German made it increasingly difficult for him
to express his views without receiving abuse related to his ethnic
origins. After 1916, his intensive support of Hughes and strong campaigning in the communities of German people heightened suspicions
about him.

Lemke recognized the danger to himself.

His primary con-

cern, however, was in connection with his effectiveness as a campaigner.
He was aware of the adverse effects of attacking too strongly and tried to
modify his own views.

Blackerby states:

"He found it easier to feel and

express loyalty to the United States than to convince others that he was
loyal. A 6 As the principal legal counsel for the League, he was to come
in for an abundant share of newspaper criticism and defamation.
Lem.ke was, as were most leaders of the movement, strongly antiwar as long as there seemed any possibility of the nation's avoiding the
conflict.

He believed that all wars were caused by a very few for their

own enrichment.

Most of the leaders of the Nonpartisan League were

both anti-imperialists and Anglophobes. 47 Lemke expressed these con-·
victions over and over in his correspondence to other members of the
League.

Blackerby stated:

"Not only at this time but through the period

of World War II, he believed that the stronghold of those who start and
ruh all wars was in the British Isles and France. 1148
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From the beginning of World War L Lemke felt that Wilson had
acceded to the British sea policy in a manner that was not neutral and
that his actions would lead to conflict.

In the early stages of the

European dispute he was unquestionably more sympathetic toward
Germany. 49 Lemke's stubbornness was displayed in some attitudes,
his undying dislike for all things British was the motive for Lemke's
blaming the loss of certain counties of North Dakota in the 1916 election.
Lemke claimed that those counties had been influenced by Canadians, by
which he implied influence on behalf of Eng land.
Blackorby stated:
While Lemke may have held the rural and German-American
vote for Hughes, he probably lost votes elsewhere by his .
vicious attacks on Wilson. His attacks on the President's
record as one of crime and murder were offensive to some. SO
The tone, the sarcasm, and the choice of words used by the leaders of
the League in their speeches were so slanderous in nature that they gave
the impression that the speakers were more against the government than
against the war.

The people listening to the speeches heard the tone

and the words and did not always know the unspoken feelings that made
it possible for Townley and Lemke to be loyal to the people and the
nation, while still abhorring the attendant abuses and corruptions that
are always a part of war.
That the Nonpartisan League leadership was responsible for statements, both written and spoken, that put them in a position of opposition
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to the war cannot be ignored. That the next six years would make that
position so frequently dangerous they may not have understood.

)

CHAPTER III

NONPARTISAN LEAGUE ATTACKS ON "WAR
PROFITEERS" AND

11

BIG BIZ"

As North Dakota prepared for statehood amid machinations for the
site of the state capital, deals for the major educational institutions,
and railroad tactics to prevent statehood, one man was moving into a
dominant position of power. Alexander McKenzie, who allied himself
with newspapers, the Northern Pacific Railroad, and powerful business
interests of Minneapolis and St. Paul, worked with these interest groups
to establish virtual colonial power over North Dakota.
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McKenzie was

·to remain the "Boss" of North Dakota until the rise of the Nonpartisan
League. This boss of political and economic affairs who worked for
busines~

interests from outside the state was the very essence of what

the League wanted to wipe away. 5
The Nonpartisan

Leag~e

2

was born and grew up as the people's

means of combating these interests, which in League parlance were
called "Big Biz.

11

League strategy was to maintain a ·barrage of constant

attacks against this foe.

The foe, however, was never very clearly

defined, and as the attacks mounted they became all-encompassing.
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In speeches and through the Nonpartisan League..:.owned newspaper, the
1

.

Leader, League spokesmen began the practice of designating all opposition by vague terms such as "McKenzie ring," "Old gang,

11

and "Big

Biz. 1153 It appears that members of the League, and its leaders, had no
exact roster of the enemy.

Circumstances occasionally dictated that

anyone not supporting the League on all issues be classed among the
opposition.

These very careless and imprecise designations eventually

alienated groups and individuals, and cost the League much support from
those who had no quarrel with the farmers' programs.
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On those

occasions when more precise interests were pointed out, those named
included subsidized newspapers, old guard politicians, industrial
manufacturers, bankers, insurance concerns, railroads, utilities,
millers, and buyers of grain.

Specific examples were even more rare,

but might include such names as the Fargo Forum, the Grand Forks
Herald, and the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce.
The Nonpartisan Leader quickly established itself as a potent
weapon for both offense and defense.

Since each membership in the

League carried an automatic subscription to the Leader, it soon had one
of the largest circulations in the state.

It was a rather well edited,

folksy publication carrying general news and items of interest to the
farmer.

The Leader provided such services as a women's page and

notices of all meetings held that were to be conducted in the German
language.

On the farm woman 1 s page, attempts at gaining support were
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found in such items as:

11 Patriotism, Politics, Chivalry and Women.

These four have been in the foreground of discussion for some years and
have formed the basis of many lectures and papers pertaining to woman
suffrage. 1155 Suffrage, like the war, was a controversial issue; and the
League was willing to appeal to women for their votes, but not at the
expense of losing others. The Leader also served as a direct contact
between the central organization and the members, and was " . . . a
means by which the leaders might guide the actions of the members, and
a method of combating the tide of bitter opposition which almost instantly
arose. 1156 The editorials· were vigilant about responding to charges made
by the opposition, and each issue set out.League principles and programs.
An example of the use of the newspaper to defend League practices while
publicizing its views is found in the following case of the membership
fee for the League. The Leader item stated:
Nobody raised particular H__ because of the many and varied
interests, but as soon as the damphool farmer effectively
organized what a whooping howl goes up from all who so dearly
love the farmer. What wonder and worry over those $ 6 or $ 9
contributions for membership and campaign fund. Has the
farmer not the right to spend $9 of his own money without it
being any other person's business? 5 7
The editor went further to point out that people within the state had contributed to party political funds in the past and it was

uo. K. ! ! " "Why

was it now wrong? 1158
The fact that neither the Leader nor the League itself ever made a
distinction between the Republican McKenzie ring and the Progressives
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greatly galled the Progressives. 59 The League could see no real difference in the platforms of the two parties, and considered both to be
unsatisfactory.

This attitude created enemies of dedicated party mem-

bers and other newspapers. The League sweepingly condemned nonsupportive newspapers as the kept press, and added insult by instituting
the appointment of official county newspapers to carry government news.
This practice was an economic threat to many publications, especially
those in the smaller towns.
The press and leadership of the opposition did not attempt to deny
the existence of evils that the Nonpartisan League- addressed, nor did
they remedy the situations. They responded by attacking League personalities and programs.
From its inception the League had followed the strategy of attacking members of the opposition in positions of political and economic
power by portraying them as adversaries of the good, honest, simple way
of life.

Such tactics of humiliation and character assassination were

reinforced by proclamations by the leaders of the League.

It was inevit-

able that many of those threatened with displacement by League ascendancy and accusation would be deeply antagonistic toward the League. 60
Newspapers, bankers, industrialists, and other parties began to use
their power and wealth to stem the growing danger to their

s~ations

in

society. The fight between the Nonpartisan League and its· opposition
was intrinsically a political battle.
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The threat to business interests was greatly heightened when
League representatives attended the Trades and Labor Assembly of Fargo
in April 1916.

Organized labor in North Dakota which had been of minor

importance in the political affairs of the state, became more significant
later that month when it endorsed the League program and all its
candidates. 61 Nonpartisan League attacks on business were also
receiving support from the United States Secretary of Labor.

Secretary

William B. Wilson was quoted .in a column of the Leader, reprinted from
an Atlantic City newspaper,. as referring to the

11

unpatriotic profiteering

of businessmen. 6 2 The Secretary wa.s quoted as saying in a speech
11

given to the United States Chamber of Commerce:
. . . I now tell you business men, it is no time to stand on your
prejudices and insist on abnormal profits. If you could not
collect such profits in peace times, you should not take advantage of the crisis of your country in times of war. . . . Labor
has been restless because the word has gone forth that iron and
steel manufacturers are making from two hundred to four hundred
per cent profits and shipping and mining companies are making
enormous profits. 63
This was the very thing that the leaders of the League had been saying in
North Dakota.

Now the League and labor were joining forces to find

solutions to their common problems.

Morlan states concerning labor and

the farmer in North Dakota that the meeting in that year may have been
11
....

of small significance . .

c

in North Dakota, but the later to be

famous fafmer-labor alliance had had its beginning. 1164
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As President of the Nonpartisan League, Townley was ofter referred
to by his detractors as "czar," "dictator," and "autocrat.

11

These terms

were more universally used to describe the titans of trusts and monopolies.
Townley disliked being cast in the same mold with business giants.
Though Townley shared the leadership of the League, and therefore its
decision making, he did retain ultimate power in his own hands. Accordingly, the organization's stand on issues was ultimately to be considered
his views. 65
It is noticeable that the Nonpartisan League contained an· unusual
number of remarkable speakers and ca_mpaigners.

In the art of persuasion

.and mass psychology certain League speakers were second to none. 66
Alice C. Poehls examined the speaking style of Townley, and stated:
Townley demonstrated an ability to adapt to his audience by
adjusting his tone, his arrangement and his evidential materials
to the particular group . . . . Townley considered the drives and
motives of his audience in terms of their emotional needs . . . .
Townley motivated his audiences primarily through the activation
of their safety needs, love needs, and needs for prestige. . . .
[He] used patriotism, fear, and social power as emotional appeals
in most of his addresses. 6?
Townley made most effective use of these techniques in arousing
strong emotion and fear within his listeners concerning freedom-particularly of speech and assembly. The opposition's harrassment,
that very early became a factor at nearly every League meeting, worked
to. Townley's advantage as a dynamic speaker.

He and others of the

League were masters in the use of humor, satire, and ridicule. Townley
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consistently linked his opponents with undemocratic processes,
unethical economic practices, licentiousness, and disloyalty.
The potent, emotional language of the League speakers provided
the ammunition of counterattack used against the League.

The opposition

had long used mud-slinging campaign tactics of its own, both on the
speakers' platforms and in the press, and soon, as a result of the
changing status of the country relative to the war, had new charges to
level against League leaders .. However distorted the use of Townley's
speeches and League publications may have been, they were the source
of statements used against the League after 1916.
It was quite natural during a war that League speakers would
address themselves to the fears of the families of soldiers. Townley
and many other League speakers played upon the emotions of love,
anxiety, and loneliness for absent family members who were away in the
service. Townley was not above using maudlin drama:
While your boys are across the water, fighting for liberty and
democracy, over there in the night some times there travel
among the bodies of the dead, some very low-down degraded
creatures in human form. They follow all war. They go among
the dead bodies of the soldiers, robbing the little things upon
their bodies--money, treasures, clothing, and the little
trinkets that might have been sent from home. 68
These statements, were calculated to elicit feelings of bitterness toward
those responsible for this absence.

It was obvious that Germany's

government was greatly responsible for the fighting, but League speakers
were intent upon showing. that there were additional culprits accountable
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and that they were influencing and directing national activities in
America.

These forces responsible as the underlying cause of conflict

were manipulators of wealth in all countries, including the United States.
They were the old and often identified enemies of the League: bankers
and industrialists who stood to gain from others doing their fighting for
them--in short, "Big Biz."
Townley told his listeners where the burden for supporting the war
was carried.
daughters •

"Since the war began you will find the farmer's wives and
o

e

out in the field pi.eking corn

I

digging Up the potatoes

I

.
gathering in the food tb feed the world and its armies of liberty. 1169
These were merely examples of the injustices. League speakers
went on to reveal the real venality which was to be found in those who
reaped benefit from such misfortune.

The vested interests to be held

accountable were pointed out:
When the government conscripted your boys, it didn't conscript
wealth, if it had, we shouldn't have to have wheatless days
and meatless days and heatless days . . . . You farmers are
trying to produce more crops than ever before, you have had to
subscribe to the Liberty Loan, the Red Cross and Y.M.C.A.
and on top of all that they now take your boys . • • . Rival
groups of monopolists are playing a dea.dly game for commercial
supremacy . . • . The con tributary causes of the present war
are various; but above horrible slaughter loom the ugly incitings
of an economic system based upon exploitation . . . . l'he pinch
of want is even now felt by millions of our people, not because
of the scarcity of things needed to support life in comfort, but
becau~e of extortionate prices foisted upon us by speculators
and g~inblers. 7 o

J
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Shortly after the declaration of war by Congress, Nonpartisan
leaders traveled to the nation's capital to make their views about fair
practices known to President Wilson and the administration.

League

leaders urged universal application of price controls on all basic consumer goods to prevent excessive profits and skyrocketing costs of farm
machinery. These leaders came away from Washington feeling that they
had gained the President's promise of fair and equal treatment for both
agricultural and industrial producers.

The League leaders, following the

Presidential visit, reported that they supported Wilson.

Their state-

ments concerning "Big Biz" were almost identical to those of Secretary
of Labor Wilson. A League pamphlet, "War

Progr~m

and Statement of

Principles, 11 stated:
We are unalterably opposed to permitting stockholders of private
corporations ~o pocket these enormous profits, while at the same
time a species of coercion is encouraged toward already poorly
paid employees of both sexes, in urging them to purchase
government bonds to help finance the war. Patriotism demands
service from all according to their capacity. To conscript men
and exempt the blood-stained wealth coined from the sufferings_
of humanity is repugnant to the spirit of America and contrary to
the ideals of democracy. 7 1
When, as the war progressed, price controls were placed upon
selected natural resources and agricultural commodities, while consumer
prices and costs of farm equiprnent were allowed to rise, the members of
the League became disenchanted with President Wilson's administration.
The price of wheat was limited to approximately two dollars per bushel,
but cotton was allowed to seek its highest mark, as were steel and
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coal. Midwesterners, and Nonpartisan members ih particular, came to
feel that they had been sold out by the President to industrial interests
within the United States and Britain. 72 The League returned to its more
caustic attacks on the enemy, because now the robbers of dead soldiers,
the plunderers of the nation, were establishing themselves as patriots.
League speakers were intent upon unmasking these abusers:
Nothing that I could imagine, up to a little while ago, is as
bad as robbing the dead body of a soldier boy . . • • But while
that is going on over there, here in this country are a group of
citizens who have talked so much about themselves that we
regard them almost as patriots, who go about among us, fat,
well kept, well groomed, who with their million ramifications
throughout this nation~, rob and plunder the mothers and
brothers and sisters of those boys who have gone across to
fight for liberty and democracy. 73
In addresses delivered by League leaders, there now appeared
such phrases as, "Their patriotism is the kind that requires war profits
to make it work,

11

and,

11

If it is right to conscript the lives of our boys

it is right to conscript the steel. 117 4 These were especially bitter and
threatening words to men of economic and political power and great selfesteem--men who also knew the power of words.

But words alone, even

when spoken by Townley in his impelling manner, hardly seem to provide
adequate explanation for the brutal reprisals of the opposition which
included mob violence and near fatal abuse of League members. 7 5 The
United States was at war and the mood was changing in the country.

It

was not just the words of League leaders that seemed to pose a threat;
these same leaders represented a dynamic, powerful, and rapidly
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expanding political movement that was building the weapon that would be
used to curtail the power and prestige of long-standing enterprises.
Townley's speeches, and even more so his organization of the Nonpartisan League, were far too skillful and far too much of a threat to be
ignored.

Frustration at League power and perhaps some guilt on the part

of those named the opposition demanded retaliation of a forceful nature.

CHAPTER IV

NONPARTISAN LEAGUE SUPPORT FOR THE WAR EFFORT

In December 1917, President Woodrow Wilson, in his "State of the
Union

11

mes sage, informed the nation that there were those within the

country whom he described as disloyal: creatures of passion and
anarchy.

They were, the President said, attempting to involve the

United States in the European War.

Continuing the message, he stated:

There are some men among us and many residents abroad who,
though born and bred in the United States and calling themselves Americans, have so forgotten themselves and their
honor as citizens as to put their passion and sympathy with
one or the other side in the great European conflict above
their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States. 76
The President called upon Americans to oppose war and called such an
attitude

11

thoughtfully patriotic Americanism."

As circumstances drew President Wilson closer to the view that
America's entrance into war on behalf of Eng land was imminent, the
leadership of the League would find it more uncomfortable to support the
government's position.

Nevertheless, owing to the President's adoption

of the position that the United States was going to war to
safe for democracy" in its struggle with the autocracy of

11

make the world

i~perialistic

Germany, the League leadership vowed to support the country.
42
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The speeches of the League leaders would from this time forward
reflect a strong backing of the "people" of the "country and more
11

especially of "the boys at the front.

11

The League had been supporting

)

the people of North Dakota, and their boys, while opposing the privilege
and abuse it saw in the business and government of the state. This was
to be the posit ion of the League toward the national government and
World War I.

Blackorby stated concerning Lemke:

Now that his native country was involved in the war, Lemke
wanted to see her victorious over Germany. But at the same
time, by all the powers vested in him, he was det'ermined to
see that the President would run the war so that there would
be no advantage accruing to Engla~d from it. 77
Lemke believed, apparently throughout his life, that the stronghold of
those who started and ran all wars was in France and Brita in.

He was

determined, as was Townley, that through the North Dakota Congressman, John M. Baer, the President should be pressured into developing
measures that would benefit neither millionaires, bankers, nor
industrialists.
The wave of early League successes in North Dakota had seemed
to draw the League into expansion and nec.essitate its becoming a
national movement.

Poehls stated that at the time of the capture of the

government in North Dakota, Townley had not included within his plans
for the Nonpartisan League anything beyond the state. 7 8
With their option to expand, the necessity of combating adversaries of a national charq.cter, and the importance of agricultural staples
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to the country militarily, demanded that the leadership of the League
divide their efforts between North Dakota and other areas of the country.
Any question that involved the we.Hare and economy of the country
involved agriculture, and any question that involved the farmers of
America involved the League.

Becoming a national movement forced the

League to take an official position regarding the war.

The decision of

the leaders was consistent with the other doctrines of their program.
The first published statement of the League's position was issued after
the Minneapolis and St. Paul National Nonpartisan League Conference
held in September of 1917. 79 The rapidity with which the Nonpartisan
League was swept into national affairs was used by critics of the League
to show that the League really never understood the importance and
complexity of certain issues connected with American entry into the war.
Defenders of the League pointed out that the secrecy and indecision that
was characteristic of the Wilson government prevented any awareness
until after the final declaration. SO
The Nonpartisan government in North Dakota did not want a war,
but when the United States entered the conflict it would support the
"boys at the front

11

as few other states were willing to do.

Newspapers

throughout the .state began to report with pride on the preparations being
undertakell: under the new military act passed by Congress and put into
effect July 1, 1916. North Dakota's National Guard had been sent with
General Pershing in an effort to police the Mexican border. After their
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return they were soon placed under direct federal control in accordance
with the new act.

This· unit would be in the first wave to leave for

duty. 81 The Grand Forks Herald in September 1917 reported the "rousing
send-offu afforded the second draft of the national army leaving for Camp
Dodge. The following Monday two regitnents of the North Dakota National
Guard were to leave for training camp.

The boys were going to the front.

North Dakota was to outstrip in per capita effort most other states
in Liberty Loan contributions, Red Cross drives, and Y. M. C .A. subscript ions.

The farmers, with the aid of their Nonpartisan movement,

increased their crop output in spite o:t: climatic adversities.

The military

units sent from the state were more fully equipped than those of most
states, thus saving the federal government much expense. 8 2 As early as
1917 the League platform included a proposal for $2 5 . 0 0 p~r month bonus
to veterans and a one year moratorium on their debts. 83 The state s pro1

vision for debt relief and loan assistance during and after military service
was consistent with League belief in just economic reward for those who
served. The war record of North Dakota, the only state with a Nonpartisan administration, was very sound.
It defies reason to explain why a government that supported the

war effort of its country so well was to have been constantly confronted
with accusations of trying to jeopardize that country.
'?':

The speakers of the Nonpartisan League did not call a truce in their
drive to find some means ·of forcing a more equitable sharing of the cost
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of war.

Townley still tore into the opposition with speeches upon the

needs of the people in wartime.

In an address given at Jamestown in

June of 1917, he stated:
This country can never succeed in war until it governs the business of transporting your products. . . . In a time like this . . .
all the liberties that your forefathers and mine fought for and won
are in jeopardy . . . ~ I am not talking this way to discourage
you in financing this war, but to impress on you the necessity
of financing it in a tremendous measure or keep your boys at
home, because they should not go there without money only to
starve. 84
Disloyalty in the League's way of thinking was in the existing system of
inequality, not among those who supported their boys in the war even
while abhorring circumstances of the conflict.
The principles of self-determinism, open negotiations, freedom
from controlled transportation and travel, removal of economic barriers,
reduction of munitions making, anti-colonialism, and guarantees of
territorial integrity can be found throughout the League resolutions and
statements of principles. 85 These principles were the foundation of
League leaders' efforts to coerce President Wilson into laying down the
terms of victory. The League hoped to prevent imperialists and despoilers
from benefiting after a victor end to the war.

They seem to have feared -

European powers and wanted the whole country to support the war to a
greater extent.
Thei-:closeness of the ideqls of the League and those expressed by
President Wilson encouraged the League.

The most satisfying effort of
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Lemke to influence the national government was a petition demanding
terms of victory.

The

11

Fourteen Point Program

11

of President Wilson was

an indication that Lemke's determination for asserting League principles
was not without merit. According to Congressman Baer:
The points listed in the petition appeq,led to the President's
idealism, [and in Baer's opinion,] President Wilson saw in
them an instrument with which he could aa6eal to the populations of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
.
It was the opinion of Representative Baer that the petition was
instrumental in motivating the President to issue the Fourteen Points.
Baer felt that, since ten of the fourteen principles .were similar in detail
to those on Lemke's petition, it was probable that one of the best known
documents of the twentieth-century was in "language and sense

11

partly

the work of William Lemke. 8 7
The Nonpartisan League believed that normally men are judged by
their ability to produce, but that in War they are ranked according to
their ability to destroy.

The League hoped that its efforts, and tho_se of

North Dakota, in support of the war could prevent destruction beyond the
havoc of the fighting.
North Dakota and the League did give their full support and aid to
the men serving in the military throughout World War .I. They went
beyond most states in supplying their share of men,. crops, and economic
protection''bf those away from their homes. The government of the United
1

States greatly praised North Dakota s contributions.

The League
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continued to demand equalized assessment of industry, conscription of
wealth, and assurance against acquisition of territory.
The League was pleased with the terms for victory as proposed in
the "Fourteen Points

11

of President Woodrow Wilson.

CHAPTER V

DISLOYALTY CHARGES IN MINNESOTA AND
THE TOWNLEY-GILBERT TRIAL

By 1918 the League was active in thirteen states and a threat to
those accustomed to govern. The months of terrorism against the League
in these states after 1917 comprise· a period in American history difficult
to assess. The League li.ad always maintained that there was a conspiracy arrayed against it, of those who had been in political control
and were turned out by the League, those who feared the economic programs that opposed monopoly, and those ultra-conservative organizations that wished to maintain the status-quo which they had professed
to be sacred.

Particularly vocal and active among the conservative,

nationalistic, and reactionary elements were the Public Safety Commissions, the Independent Voters Association, the Loyal Voters Association, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, The Sound Government
League, and the Public Defense Councils.

Whether conspiring to defeat

the League or not, these groups did comprise a vendetta assemblage.
Morlan informs us that it was scarcely deniable that many high
officials, persons in posit ions of economic power, and numerous
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newspaper editors either feared or hated the League because they were
part of the p~litical and economic factions the League had attacked. 88
This does not completely explain, however, the amount of crowd and
mob brutalities.
Each side was sweeping in its accusations and imprudent in its
use of words to describe the other's principles and personalities.
Beyond the uses of rhetoric and caustic newsprint, the opposition to the
League increasingly availed itself of methods that were physically as
well as civilly abusive.

Mobbings, beatings, tarring and featherings,

jailings, and injunctions against the League were applauded, if not
backed, by entrenched political and economic groups.

Concerning the

unusual amount of terrorism, Russell stated:
There is no doubt that agents were sent out from St. Paul and
Minneapolis in advance to stage some of these riots, and
little question that the enginery of the state was in some
instances, . . . deliberately employed on the same side.
One speaker was mobbed for reading to an audience extracts
from President Wilson's The New Freedom; others were mobbed
for reading the Bible. Wherever it was known that the League
was almost ready to establish a branch the efforts were
redoubled to ca use some outbreak or breach of the peace that
could be used to the advantage of the milling and elevator
interests. 89
·
Seeing the League as a dangerous threat to property and privilege which
they reverenced, these groups felt strongly justified in availing themselves of any method to rid the nation of "unpatriotic 11 forces. go
Tweton and Jelliff wrote:
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The loyalty issue was a handy and potent weapon against a
· political opponent who had the popular side of an argument,
and the lengths to whiCh this opposition and a fanatical brand
of "patriotism were carried constitutes a sordid chapter in
the history of Minnesota. 9 1
11

It was in Minnesota, rather than North Dakota, the stronghold of
Nonpartisan membership, that the organizers and speakers of the League
experienced the most virulent charges and attacks upon their loyalty to
the United States.
11

Big Biz.

11

Minnesota was also, of course, the nearest center of

Attorneys long on ambition and short on integrity seemed to be

in great supply, and law enforcement officials were prone to view
violence as natural if it aided the traditional political structure to which
they owed their positions.

Such were the times, that these attitudes

toward law and order served to foster more intense turmoil and encouraged
more extreme action within crowds.
The anti-League news media provided an ample and continuous
supply of rumor upon which the opposition could act. The Grand Forks
Herald, The Fargo Independent, The Courier News, the Twin City newspapers, and the America First magazine formed the nucleus from which
many opposition publications took their

cu~. 92 . Nationally syndicated

columnists picked up and disseminated the items found in these papers.
This resulted in considerable damage to the reputation of the League and
North Dakota throughout the United States

a

The reporting of these news

sources ranged from misunderstanding to misquoting and falsification.
Editorials and reporting were regularly so slanted that the text of
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speeches and the facts of many League statements and activities were
distorted beyond recognition.

Lemke, Townley, and other leaders of the

League were so consistently "mistakenly quoted" that they had to hire
stenographers to record their speeches in order to have an accurate
record of their words. 93 Even recorders did not prove to be sufficient
in court or when officials chose to ignore the facts.
The power of the press was most notable when Townley and others
were indicted for disloyalty and sedition. Anti-League news coverage
without hesitation pronounced guilt and tried cases before the courts
convened. 94 . Such reporting by the "kept press 11 was perhaps the most
damaging of all the tactics to the League as a political movement.
One incident of error by the press in reporting a speech made at the
1

St. Paul Producers' and Consumers Conference in September 1917 demonstrates the fatal power of the press.

Senator Robert M. La Follette was

scheduled to be the last speaker at the conference.

Lemke and other

League leaders, fearing a press over-anxious to find something treasonous, convinced La Follette to set aside his prepared speech and talk
extemporaneously.

In an exchange with a heckler, La Follette stated:

"We had a grievance against Germany. 11 This was carried in the Associated Press as:

"We had no grievance against Germany. 1195 This news

item was picked up by newspapers all over the country and cited as
:>':'..

evidence that the League supported disloyalty.

Many of the League

leaders felt that this incident played a major part in the growing
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repudiation of the League and its leadership.

It was many months later

that the Associated Press admitted that the inclusion of the word "no"
had been a mistake. 9 6 By this time, however, the damage to the League
and the advantage for the opposition was an accomplished fact.
It was from this same convention that the National Nonpartisan War .

Program and Statement of Principles was issued; this pamphlet served as
the basis for the sedition charges which were lodged against Townley
and Joseph Gilbert, who was a. hired organizer for the Nonpartisan League.
It was also at this convention that Townley made the speech that would

be the primary source for evidence that was used by the prosecution in
his disloyalty trial in Jackson, Minnesota.
Some of the most frequently misquoted and intentionally perverted
examples from Townley's speeches can only lead to the conclusion that
there was little or no real basis for charges of sedition in Minnesota.
The essential tone and style of the Townley approach is demonstrated by
the following:
All young men who are on the farms ought to be left on the farms
to raise crops and not taken into the army . . . . the boys
shouldn't be taken into the army, they are better off where they
are than in the trenches five thousand miles away. . . . why
the millions of American manhood sacrificed upon the bloody field
of war? . . . It is equally unjust to permit lobbyists to oppose
the conscription of wealth without let or hinderance, while making
it a crime for a mother to oppose the conscription of the life of
her son. 97
The subject matter, the tone of assertion, and the words themselves did not constitute .reasonable grounds for either sedition or

54
l .

disloyalty charges.

It must be added also that, without fiery polemics,

Townley and other League ·speakers could not have hoped to retain an
audience for the great length of some of their speeches.

It was not the

orations and publications frequently used to attack the League that were
the truly offensive elements so hated by the opposition.

The real

essence of Nonpartisanism that rankled the opposition was the strategy
of casting business, press, and old guard politicians as murderers and
exploiters.
Local officials and other opponents of the League instigated
charges against several of the organization's leaders and workers at one
time or another.

Most of these charges were never followed through to

the extent of coming to trial.

They were a tactic used to prevent Non-

partisan speeches and organizing activities.

The most notable case of

trumped-up accusations being pushed through the court was the TownleyGilbert trial.

This was the event that would be used with continuing

effect to discredit both the League and its leadership.
Gilbert had been arrested on other occasions.

In fact, many

League organizers and speakers had been arrested frequently on bogus
charges before they could reach the places they were to speak.

This

practice was especially well employed in Minnesota, where militant
efforts to prevent the farmers from assembling and hearing speeches
were well coordinated.
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The arrest of A. C. Townley on charges of e-mploying Gilbert was
based upon Gilbert's distribution of the "War Program
upon speeches Gilbert had made on those occasions.

11

pamphlet and
The prosecution

based its case on the allegedly seditious statements in these pamphlets
and upon Townley's speech.

The actual legal charge, however, was

conspiracy. This was made necessary because in spite of the fact that
the pamphlet had in an earlier case in Martin County, Minnesota, been
found seditious the decision had been overturned by the State Supreme
Court. The State Supreme Court ruling stated:
The resolutions, taken as a whole appear to be nothing more
serious than a rhetorical and somewhat flamboyant platform on
which a certain class of citizens are s_olicited to join an organization whose avowed purpose is the amelioration of alleged
evils of present economic conditions. 98
Morlan has characterized County Attorney Albert R. Allen of Martin
County and County Attorney E. H. Nichols of Jackson County, who
prosecuted the cases against the pamphlet and against Gilbert and
Townley, as two of the state 1 s most vehement
)

11

super-patriots"; they

were almost fanatical opponents of the Nonpartisan League, often
becoming deranged in their speech when it concerned the League. 99
In the trial at Jackson County, the charges were conspiring to
teaqh against enlistment. The prosecution based its case almost
entirely upon the testimony of Ferdinand Teigen, a former League
organizer who was dismissed from the League for dishonesty, and whose
testimony was repeatedly shown to be untruthful.

Judge Dean, the
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presiding judge, would not allow the defense attorneys to conduct their
case to prove that Townley and Gilbert were widely recognized loyal
citizens.

He charged that they must confine their defense to proving

that they were not disloyal. lOO This prevented the introduction of a letter
from President Wilson personally thanking Townley for his patriotic
cooperation.

There were similar letters from George Creel of the United

States Justice Department, and a multitude of letters, speeches, and
editorials from Townley's own Nonpartisan activities which urged support
for the war. lO 1 Judge Dean defined for the court and again for the jury
the interpretation that would be placed upon the term conspiracy. The
term was defined to mean that any two or more persons jointly acting
toward the same end could form a conspiracy. They did not have to be
acting in an organized or concerted way.
to be directly aware of the other's doings.

One conspirator did no.t have
They did not have to carry

the act through to its conclusion, and circumstantial evidence was
sufficient for guilt.

Conviction did not require proof of personal contact

or planning.
The trial which convicted Townley and Gilbert was a travesty
against justice and a farce of legal procedure.

It was not a Federal

statute they were tried for violating; it was a state law passed by the
Minnesota Legislature after the Nonpartisan League began to make headway. at organizing the state. lOZ

On July 14, 1919, the Grand Forks

American, a League paper, published the following article.
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Minnesota has in its midst both the witch-burner and the
inquisition.
A. C. Townley, president of the National Nonpartisan League,
is found guilty. And with him, Joseph Gilbert, one of his
lieutenants.
No sour and solemn gathering of the town elders in Old
Salem ever perpetrated such a monstrous judgment in the
name of justice and law upon a magic worker.
• . . For Townley's "crime is not disloyalty, but magic
working arid political heresy. 103
11

Although the war was over before Townley was convicted and served
his sentence, the charges were made near the end of the terrible conflict,
and the damage accomplished by the charges could not be erased.
Hatreds and passions of war do not evaporate with the signing of a cease
fire.

Long after this, opposition forces frequently used copies or state-

ments about the conviction in the press and from the podium while
pointedly ignoring to mention the nature of the conviction or the charges.
The damaging evidence ·was just as potent as though it were a legitimate
conviction. Denial and defense by the Nonpartisan League leaders only
made them appear less creditable. 104
The real League failure in the loyalty issue would seem to have
been that Townley and other leaders of the League should have been more
aware of the danger from those they claimed to know as established
_)

perverters of justice--the opposition. The League leaders were guilty of
not making a more thorough investigation into the possibility of such a
decision ,.from the Jackson County Court.
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In November 1921, Arthur C. Townley finally began to serve a
ninety-day jail sentence in Jackson, Minnesota, for "conspiring to discourage enlistments."

CHAPTER VI

THE STIGMA OF DISLOYALTY

The Nonpartisan League and its leadership continued to face
increasing denunciations of disloyalty.

Having found a potent and ready

weapon to use against the League, the opposition was not going to miss
any opportunity to take advantage of it.
The Nonpartisan League and A. C. Townley had been praised by
President Wilson in a letter in which the President recognized North
Dakota's efforts to support the war effort through production of agricultural goods, and their support of "the boys at the front.

11

The President

of the United States found no reason to question their loyalty. The
office of the Attorney General of the United States had investigated the
allegations of sedition against the League leaders.

These investigations

were instrumental in the Attorney General's Office clearing the Nonpartisan League and its leaders of any charges of disloyalty.

Indeed,

George Creel of the Justice Department went beyond just words of
clearance; he praised the activities of the League.
League historian after the war, Creel stated:
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In a letter to a
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I am not at all unwilling to give you my opinion with respect
to the war attitude of the Nonpartisan League. Never at any time
did I consider it a disloyal organization. On the contrary, the
war record of the state of North Dakota, controlled by the League ,
proved conclusively that the membership, taken as a whole, gave
America faithful and ungrudging support in the hour of need . . • ~
I sent for the heads of various agricultural bodies and unions,
and among those that came to Washington in response to the call
was Mr. Townley, head of the Nonpartisan League. I found him,
just as I found the others, full of distrust and suspicions born of
many lies that he had read and heard. I took him, as I took
others, to the President himself, and the interview removed every
doubt as to the necessity of the war and the high purpose of
America. . . . When Mr. Townley left Washington he had not
only pledged the full support of his organization to the war, but
he had struck hands with Mr. Hoover and promised every coop. erative effort. These pledges were kept. 105
In spite of these assurances, Lemke and Townley and other leaders
of the League could not save themselves from charges of disloyalty.
Opponents of the League ·and organizations that were trying to elevate
their own positions by zealous activity found in the League a readymade and already accused culprit. 106 They would not let the charges
die, and the majority of-the press aided them in maintaining the fiction
of the accusations. Lemke, who more and more was in charge when
Townley was absent, suffered constantly increasing abuse after 1921,
even though the war was over; this was partly due to the fact that the
agricultural Northwest went into a post-war depression, and abuse of the
1

League seemed to ease some people s fear.

After these events and the

attendant publicity, neither the League nor Townley was able to recover
'!!'°

any former drive or respect.
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One area of the League s activities suffered the most from this
stress.

The organizational efforts of the League were constantly met

with already formed attitudes and often misinformed press coverage.

In

an effort to revive his own commitment and to combat the misunderstanding of the people, Townley either offered or agreed to debate William
Langer in 1921.
William Langer had emerged from a political background of
progressivism, his father having spent one session in the North Dakota
legislature.

The father, Frank Langer, refused to return to politics after

this first encounter. Those who knew. Frank were unanimous in expressing the opinion that his distaste for politics resulted from his extreme
honesty.

Unlike his father, William Langer made a lifetime career of

politics; and unlike his father, honesty did not seem to be an accusation
often used against him.
Langer gained his first notable recognition when, as assistant
states attorney, he zealously attacked bootlegging.
for seeking Nonpartisan support to higher office.

This was his basis

Langer had been

friends with Lemke and other League leaders as a student at the University of North Dakota.

He used his friendship with Lemke to aid him in

getting an endorsement in 1916. Agnes Geelan in her biography, The
Dakota Maverick: The Political Life of William Langer, stated:
;i:.
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He skillfully maneuvered an endorsement to run for attorney
general from the Nonpartisan League's first nominating and
endorsing convention in 1916, and it can be said that Bill
Langer' s progressive political career was launched. lO?
Having secured the nomination, Langer promptly backed out on the agreement he had made with Lemke. 108 When elected Attorney General of the
state as part of the Nonpartisan list of endorsed candidates, he had statewide attention.

His first year in office was hardly over before he began

to break with the Nonpartisan League. When the break became complete,
Langer joined forces with the Independent Voters Association, the major
North Dakota foe of the League. Langer was to reconvert to a Leaguer
after a setback in his career again made the League necessary to him.
During his tenure with the Independent Voters Association, Langer became
a frequent contributor to the anti-League publications in the Red Flame.
The Red Flame was created as an anti-League medium, and had little
other purpose; it can be correctly described as a radically conservative
"rag." 109 This publication was to do more than any other newspaper to
1

keep alive the terms "free love," ' bolshevik," and "anti-Christian. "
The Townley-Langer debate tour throughout Kansas became the most
continuously absorbing focus of the newspapers throughout Kansas.

The

American Legion of Kansas gave Langer much verbal support in his debate
tour, presenting him as the representative of Loyalty in his contest with
th.e disloyal Townley.

The C_ourier News on March 30, 1921, carried the

following comment about Langer as patriot:
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Oh, dear, no! To the American Legion this man who stayed
home during the war, and whose patriotism was questioned by
the extremely patriotic Forum, is the leading exponent of 100
per cent Americanism . . . . Can someone please tell us how
to tell a loyalist from a disloyalist? Is this the test: That
any man who questions the divine right of Wall Street to rule
is disloyal, and anyone who upholds Wall Street and its warprofiteering is loyal? 110
The widely varied positions of the Red Flame and The Courier News
were reflected throughout the tour of Kansas in the newspape.rs of over
twenty-five towns visited by Townley and Langer. These local newspapers created about the same picture as existed from only the League's
publication or only the opposition's news.
The Herrington Times reported:

11
•••

The talks amounted to an

exchange of bitter personalities, Langer charged Townley with a great
many things and Townley ignoring them. 11111 The editor concluded that
the debates were simply a clever manner for gaining an undisturbed hearing for Townley in communities he would not dare visit as an advocate of
the Nonpartisan League .112 This was due to his position against the war,
for which he was at that time
was patently untrue.

11

under jail sentence," 113 a statement that

The Concordia Blade-Empire printed Townley's reply

to the question of 11 Why he had been jailed.

11

He stated:

I made hundreds of speeches during the war, fighting the fight
of the farmers against the grain gamblers and the beef trusts.
The government had agents. taking stenographic notes of everything I said. . . . Finally the grain gamblers found a little two
by four county attorney in Jackson County I Minnesota I who
would work for them . • . . I was convicted and sentenced to
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three months in jail. Think of it, three months in jail. And
think of all the trouble I caused the trusts and grain robbers
while they were framing [me]. 114
The most balanced reporting came from the Tiller and Toiler, a Farm-Labor
publication which characterized two debators according to speaking
ability. This newspaper stated:
Langer . . . is a fiery, hammer and tongs debator--rapid,
impetious, defiant, dogmatic, discourteous, vindictive,
malicious and verbally ferocious • . . . Townley is the better
speaker, calm, deliberate, courteous in word and demeanor
(with rare exception), gruelingly sarcastic, adroitly ironical
and damnably plausible. 115
This was the gener.:al pattern to the reporting of the debates in
Kansas. The stigma of disloyalty was kept alive, since each newspaper
made some comment about Townley's trial and sentence for this charge.
Not one of these newspapers had the correct information concerning the
conspiracy, and many, having obtained their information from the
American Defense League, an American Legion auxillary, made ._some
comment concerning

11

free love," "socialist," and "atheist" or "anti-

Christian. 11116 In most of these newspapers the debates were
publicized several days before they were to take place.

Since the

standard American Defense League advance news item could hardly be
called unbiased, Townley never entered a town before he had been
branded by
JP

th~

press as disloyal.

He could not escape these charges

even in those newspapers that favored him after the debate.
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Blackorby stated:
The years of speaking and persecution had told on Townley;
for a time he did not have as much to give as he had had in
earlier years. When he was not in the state to take top billing at League rallies, it was often Lemke's name which was
used to draw the crowds. . . . But Lemke's preoccupation with
the North Dakota League did mean that he was becoming less
and less a guiding influence at national headquarters . 117
The stigma of dis.loyalty took its toll, and the National Nonpartisan
League was changing its organization.
ranks those with a stigma of disloyalty.

It was retiring from its front

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Nonpartisan League may have been the creation of popular
leaders who only sensed the changing climate in America and moved out
of fear; it may have been the product of men imbued with the insight that
a pattern of life basically agrarian was being replaced by industrialism
in all its complexity, leading eventually to a morass of inescapable
problems; in any case, the League was in the forefront of reform at a time
when faith in the inevitability of progress was disappearing.

When one

seeks to understand the process by which Americans were stripped of
their tnnocence and faith, there is a temptation to see this as one more
consequence of the cataclysmic changes wrought by World War I. The
contrast before and after the war was sharp, but not all of the major
ideas and attitudes of the preceding era were totally erased.
This period of the American past contains no more distinctive
occurrence than the political destruction of leading thinkers and ideals
of the Progressive Era.

The extreme rapidity of this change during the

six years of the war is hard to- grasp. Leaders who were molding public
opinion at the outbreak of the war were reduced to ineffective wonderment

66

67

by the time of its conclusion.

This creates a problem of explanation,

because the swiftness of the change is as important as the content.
Both A. C. Townley and William Lemke were men of extremes,
commitment, and sincerity; and briefly they were men of power.

They

failed, however, to recognize adequately the degree of power and commitment possessed by their opponents, and the extremes to which they
would be willing to go.

They did not comprehend that the Independent

Voters Association, the traditional parties, the milling and grain
interests, ----the- railroads, and the businessmen were involved in a

---------------- -

---·--

-

-·----·-·---------·-

struggle that was as important to them as life. The opposition was
willing and able to use methods that were distasteful to the League.
Even after 1919 it was highly possible that everything was not
lost.

Restrained actions, careful statements, and the practice of

moderation in proposed programs might have created the time needed to
give attention to past gains and consolidation of Midwestern aims.
Blackorby felt that neither Lemke nor Townley possessed the temperament
and moderation needed to accomplish retrenchment.
boomed too rapidly into a national
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The League

organiz~tion.

The success of the Nonpartisan League as long as it employed nonpartisan tactics and a balance of power position between the traditional
parties was assured. When the League moved toward a farmer-labor
~

union, it began to take on the characteristics of a third party, but it
lacked the leadership and breadth of program that such a new status
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required.

Russell suggested that Townley's genius was limited to the

promotional and organizational work and that he lacked the needed
qualities to moderate and maintain the flexibility necessary for a
political nboss. 11119 What began as a farmers and citizens group using
the machinery and techniques of the traditional political parties became
a political organization possessing party machinery and techniques of its
own; it thereby lost its unique cause of success.
The League's carelessness in defining "the opposition" alienated
the support and membership of many people who, because of the nature
of their small-town affinities and occ.upational enterprises / were not
really the opposition.
11

The farmers alone did not possess as much

sticker" awareness as was required to cement them into a long-standing

power.

They could not manage without the leadership of a Townley to

work for their own long-run interests. When World War I changed
attitudes, the "radical" movements were attacked in all sections of the
country; and it was easy to make the League appear too socialistic and
foreign dominated.

The farmer could not accept being viewed as radical;

he was easily confused by revolt within hi.s own ranks, as exemplified by
Langer and the State Library affair, and soon lost faith in the movement.
The Nonpartisan League of North Dakota achieved massive reforms
in insurance; in reduction of control by milling, terminal, and transporta1'

tion interests; in banking and loan establishments; and in the nature of
the state legislature, mal<ing it responsive to the people.

It also
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responded dynamically to World War I and supported the "boys at the
front.

11

This was all that many League members felt needed to be

accomplished and allowed them to return to a more conservative outlook.
These traditionally conservative elements were able to reduce future
League successes by organizing League-like movements of their own,
such as the Sound Government League of Minnesota and the Independent
Voters Association in North Dakota. lZO
The Nonpartisan League was irreparably damaged by the images of
anti-yvar programs and disloyalty associated with it.

It is evident that

several members of the League, very important leaders among them, were
anti-war and opposed government intervention on behalf of England.
While they continued to detest abuses by industrial and mining interests,
_they nevertheless supported the sons of the people of the country at war
with unusual dedication.

The national government did not at any time

find sufficient reason to act against the Nonpartisan League for questionable loyalty and, indeed, praised the League for its cooperative support
of the war effort .
The anti-League reaction in Minnesota, where old guard politics,
11

Big Biz," banking and railroad interests, and the "kept press

11

were

dominant, was irascible to a degree which can hardly be explained in
terms other than. organized hysteria.

The clashes between League

members and opposition forces were violent only when the opposition
instigated terrorist activities.

The war mentality aided League
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opponents, who found it easy to equate mob action with "Americanism"
against unusual economic and political ideals.

Many League opponents

held the sadly misguided notion that they could proclaim and bolster their
own patriotism by mistreating groups with German-Russian ancestry.
That the League offered a real threat to the traditional political machines,
economic powers, and conservative newspapers is evident by the degree
of opposition so swiftly and frenetically mounted against it.
A. C. Townley, through his speeches and dynamic actions, invited
retaliation.

Bahmer stated:

11
....

at no point does it appear that

Townley was corrupt; his failure lay rather in his inability to regard the
opposition as being dedicated to the same extent that he was. 11121 The
Minnesota court conviction for which he served a jail sentence approaches
the limits of judicial abuse and in itself seems criminal.

Judged on the

basis of all materials available, neither Townley nor Lemke was disloyal,
although each opposed inequities in the economic policies of the government and was not an Anglophile.

Officials in Washington, including the

President and Justice and Agricultural heads, found no reason for
questioning their loyalty.

Nevertheless, disloyalty charges were

responsible for the political career wrecking of both Townley and Lemke.
Neither of them ever fully recovered his former respectability.
The"power of the press was demonstrated by its response to the
Leag·ue and the degree to which it is inadequately qualified to interpret
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most events.

In retrospect, the press demonstrated a lack of integrity

and responsibility that makes questionable the justification of its power.
Finally, to explain the fate of the League during and after World
War I, it must be remembered that the irrationality of the voter is easily
triggered. While he is frequently accurate in his judgment, he is also
sometimes as fickle as the wind.
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